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United States v. Stevens:




In United States v. Stevens,' the Court continued a trend-one that
has largely united the justices in recent decades-of contracting
government power to enforce content-based regulations of expres-
sion, even when those regulations receive overwhelming support
from elected officials2 and the general public, and even when the
expression conveys ideas or depicts actions that most people con-
sider offensive or wrongful. Content-based speech regulations pose
* Professor Strossen thanks New York Law School students David Henek and Russell
Smith for their invaluable assistance with research and footnotes. Additional appreci-
ated contributions were made by NYLS students Lisabeth Jorgensen, Joseph Schnei-
derman, and Trevor Timm. Important consultation, training and administrative sup-
port were provided by two NYLS staff colleagues: Michael Roffer, associate librarian
for reader services and professor of legal research; and Steven Cunningham, senior
administrative assistant.
1 559 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
2 The statute that the Court struck down in Stevens, 18 U.S.C. § 48, was passed in
the Senate by unanimous consent and in the House of Representatives by a vote of
372-42. H.R. 1887, 106th Cong. (1999). See Bill Summary & Status, 106th Congress
(1999-2000), H.R. 1887, Major Congressional Actions, available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d06:HR1887:@@@R; Office of the Clerk, House
of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 514 ,(October 19, 1999), available
at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1999/roll514.xml.
The Court has struck down restrictions on burning the U.S. flag, see United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); burning a Ku
Klux Klan-style cross, see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); photographs or films that appear to depict children engaging
in sexual conduct (but do not in fact portray actual minors), see Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); and advertising for tobacco products that is aimed
at minors, see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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the greatest danger to the core value underlying the First Amend-
ment: the right of individuals to make their own choices about
what ideas to express, receive, and believe, free of governmental
limitations or manipulation. Nonetheless, the Court has not categor-
ically pronounced all content-based speech regulations automati-
cally unconstitutional,' thus leaving the door open for those who
continue to seek to regulate certain forms of controversial expression.
Congress stepped through this door in 1999 by enacting 18 U.S.C.
§ 48, which criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession
of certain depictions of treatment of animals that is illegal in some
U.S. jurisdictions.' In Stevens, the Supreme Court shut the door on
I As the Court has explained, in contrast with content-neutral regulations of the
"time, place, and manner" of expression-for example, noise control regulations in
residential neighborhoods-regulations that target the content of expression "pose
the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory
goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or to manipulate the public
debate through coercion rather than persuasion." Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
s Justice Anthony Kennedy has advocated this position concerning any expression
that is not within one of the traditional categorical exclusions from the First Amend-
ment that the Court has recognized, such as for obscenity or defamation. For all
content-based regulations of protected expression, Justice Kennedy has maintained
that strict scrutiny is inappropriate; in his view, such regulations should be per se
unconstitutional. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792-93 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims
Bd. 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6 The statute's title, as well as its legislative history, is aimed at depictions of "animal
cruelty," but it actually sweeps more broadly, encompassing images of animal treat-
ment that is illegal for any reason, even if there is no cruelty (a term that does not
appear in the key statutory language). The statute reads in full:
Section 48. Depiction of animal cruelty
(a) CREATION, SALE, OR POSSESSION. - Whoever knowingly creates, sells,
or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that
depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) EXCEPTIONS. - Subsection (a) does not apply to any depiction that has
serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical or artis-
tic value.
(c) DEFINITIONS. - In this section -
(1) the term "depiction of animal cruelty" means any visual or auditory
depiction, including any photograph, motion-picture film, video recording, elec-
tronic image, or sound recording of conduct in which a living animal is intention-
ally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such conduct is illegal
under Federal law or the law of the State in which the creation, sale, or possession
takes place, regardless of whether the maiming, mutilation, torture, wounding,
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Section 48, which it struck down on facial overbreadth grounds.'
Moreover, the Court came close to shutting the door on two major
supporting rationales that have consistently been advanced by advo-
cates of not only Section 48 but also other content-based regulations.
The Court did this by reinterpreting two of its past rulings that did
countenance content-based regulations, upon which proponents of
such regulations routinely rely (as did the government in Stevens):
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire' and New York v. Ferber.'
Chaplinsky laid out criteria for excluding certain content-based
categories of expression from First Amendment protection.0 Ferber
upheld a statute criminalizing child pornography-images record-
ing sexual conduct by children-principally on a "drying-up-the-
market" rationale, thereby allowing the government to pursue the
unusually important goal of preventing child sexual abuse by crimi-
nalizing the resulting images and reducing the economic incentive
to engage in the abuse." In Stevens, the Court significantly recast
both Chaplinsky and Ferber in ways that substantially rein in their
precedential force as foundations for further inroads into the cardinal
rule against content regulations.
The government's primary argument in Stevens was that the Court
may expand the set of content-based speech categories that it deems
wholly excluded from First Amendment protection whenever it con-
cludes, under Chaplinsky's general balancing test, that the expression
is "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality." 2 In addition, the government argued that
Ferber's drying-up-the-market rationale also justified Section 48."
or killing took place in the State; and
(2) the term "State" means each of the several States, the District of Colum-
bia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other com-
monwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006).
'130 S. Ct. at 1588.
8 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
9 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
10 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
" Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759-60.
12 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S at 571-72).
13 Reply Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010)
(No. 08-769).
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Although the Court itself has rarely, if ever, actually accepted
either of these rationales for expanding the range of permitted con-
tent-based speech regulations-the "Chaplinsky rationale"" or the
"Ferber rationale"'-both rationales are regularly cited by Congress
and other lawmakers in enacting censorial laws. Lower court judges
have also accepted them, as illustrated by the statute at issue in
Stevens. Both rationales were stressed in Section 48's legislative his-
tory, in support of the conclusion that Section 48 was constitutional."
In the Stevens litigation, one or both rationales were accepted by the
federal district court judge," who rejected Stevens's First Amend-
ment challenge to Section 48, as well as by three Third Circuit judges"8
and Justice Samuel Alito.19 Indeed, the Supreme Court's Stevens
opinion acknowledged that the government's arguments were
grounded in language that the Court had set out in Chaplinsky and
repeatedly reiterated, including in Ferber.20 Therefore, the Court
14 The Court has rarely, if ever, actually sanctioned a new categorical First Amendment
exception beyond the longstanding, traditional exceptions such as the ones that
Chaplinsky itself listed, e.g., obscenity, defamation, and "fighting words." Before the
Supreme Court's decision in Stevens, conventional wisdom had viewed the Court's
1982 decision in Ferber as classifying child pornography as a new category of constitu-
tionally unprotected expression. However, the Court's Stevens opinion, as explained
below, recasts Ferber as one specific instance of a prior, longstanding categorical
exception for expression that is "an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute." Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)). See also Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 246 (declaring
that virtual child pornography is not "an additional category of unprotected speech");
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (stating that there is no "separate juridical
category" for expression involving the U.S. flag).
15 See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 254 (rejecting the drying-up-the-market ra-
tionale as a sufficient justification for outlawing "virtual child pornography," which
is produced without using actual children, and distinguishing Ferber); Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529-31 & n.13 (2001) (rejecting the drying-up-the-market ratio-
nale as a sufficient justification for punishing the publication of illegally intercepted
mobile phone conversations, where the media publishers did not participate in the
illegal interception, and distinguishing Ferber).
16 H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 4-5 (1999) (Conf. Rep).
17 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583 (describing the district court's decision, which is
unreported).
1' See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2008) (Cowen, J.,
dissenting).
19 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1599-1602 (Alito, J., dissenting).
20
1 Id. at 1585-86 (majority opinion).
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seized on the opportunity that the Stevens case presented to check
the most far-ranging, speech-suppressive implications of both
Chaplinsky and Ferber.
Part I of this article provides an overall analysis of Section 48
and the Stevens litigation. Part II summarizes the importance of the
general prohibition on content-based speech regulations, and the
two major types of exceptions to that prohibition that the Court has
condoned, as illustrated by Chaplinsky and Ferber. Parts III and IV
explore the two most important general issues the Stevens case pre-
sented: the appropriate limits on these two major exceptions to the
ban on content regulation. Part III notes a counterintuitive aspect
of Stevens's tightened criteria for recognizing a categorical exclusion
from the First Amendment: by insisting that any such exclusion is not
new but simply the explicit identification of historically unprotected
speech-whose implicit exclusion is deeply rooted in history and
tradition-the Court actually increases free speech protection. Typi-
cally, however-or at least stereotypically-anchoring the scope of
constitutional rights, including freedom of speech, in history and
tradition has had the opposite effect; it has restricted protection of
these rights. Finally, Part V applies Stevens's sharply limited criteria
for permissible content-based regulations to two narrower potential
alternatives to Section 48, which would target only the two specific
types of depictions that were the primary concern of Section 48's
proponents: "crush" and dogfighting videos. It concludes that the
government might be able to submit evidence justifying restrictions
on crush videos under Stevens's tightened First Amendment stan-
dards but the evidence that was introduced in Stevens itself suggest
that the government would have a hard time restricting dogfight-
ing videos.2'
I. Analysis of Section 48 and the Stevens Decision
The Supreme Court rejected the government's primary argument:
that the depictions targeted by Section 48 should be added to the
few content-based categories of expression that the Court has held
21 The government and other proponents of Section 48 sometimes focused specifically
on dogfighting videos, and sometimes on videos (or other depictions) of animal
fighting more generally. The same First Amendment analysis would apply to any
of these depictions, although the pertinent empirical evidence would of course vary.
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to be completely outside the First Amendment.' Once the Court
determined that Section 48 outlawed protected expression-that
is, expression that prima facie falls within the First Amendment's
protective ambit-the Court subjected Section 48 to facial over-
breadth analysis and struck it down as substantially overbroad.23
In light of this holding, it is noteworthy that Section 48 outlawed
a much wider range of depictions than those on which its legislative
history focused. Throughout the legislative process, supporters of
Section 48 stressed that they were seeking to suppress "crush vid-
eos," which "feature the intentional torture and killing of helpless
animals."24 These videos "typically show 'mice, hamsters, and other
small animals' being crushed to death," but "some crush videos
have been made showing 'cats, dogs, and even monkeys being tor-
tured."'" Crush videos often depict women slowly crushing animals
to death "with their bare feet or while wearing high heeled shoes,"
sometimes while "talking to the animals in a kind of dominatrix
patter" over "[t]he cries and squeals of the animals, obviously in
great pain."26 These videos "appeal to persons with a very specific
sexual fetish."27 Accordingly, both parties in the Stevens litigation
acknowledged that crush videos could be prosecuted under existing
obscenity statutes.28 Crush videos might well satisfy the Court's three
criteria for the traditional obscenity exception to the First Amend-
ment: the material, "taken as a whole, appeal[s] to the prurient
interest in sex, . . .portray[s] sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way," and "does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value."29 Although the actions depicted in crush videos are
outlawed throughout the United States," the statute's proponents
' Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
2 Id. at 1587-89.
24 H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 2 (1999) (Conf. Rep.).
I Brief for the United States at 17, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010)
(No. 08-769).
26 d. at 17.
27 Id. at 42.
2 See id. at 42-43; See Brief for the Respondent at 50-51, United States v. Stevens,
130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08-769).
29 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
1 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1599.
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maintained that it is difficult to prosecute the participants because
the videos typically do not provide any clues to their identities.3
Despite the legislative history's focus specifically on crush videos,
Section 48 was written much more broadly, to encompass any depic-
tions of specified treatment of animals that is illegal "under Federal
law or the law of the State in which the creation, sale, or possession
takes place," even if the conduct was perfectly legal where it oc-
curred.32 Moreover, the specified types of treatment were not limited
to those that involved cruelty, but also included any illegal "wound-
ing" or "killing."33 Accordingly, the statute criminalized depictions
of hunting or fishing that was legal where it took place but violated
the specific regulations where the resulting image was sold or pos-
sessed-for example, because it took place on a date that was not
within that jurisdiction's pertinent hunting or fishing season, or
because it used a weapon that was not permitted in that jurisdiction.
Recognizing the constitutional problems that this sweeping statutory
language posed, and consistent with the legislative history's specific
concern about crush videos, President Bill Clinton, when he signed
Section 48, announced that, "to ensure that the Act does not chill
protected speech," the executive branch would interpret it as cover-
ing only depictions "of wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal
to a prurient interest in sex."'
Notwithstanding the Clinton administration's limiting interpreta-
tion of Section 48, after the end of that administration, Robert J.
Stevens was indicted under Section 48 because of three videos he
sold that included depictions of dogfighting and fights between dogs
and other animals." The government never contended that any of
these depictions was "designed to appeal to a prurient interest in
sex," and the depictions were obviously not the crush videos that
had been of central concern to Congress. Stevens moved to dismiss
the indictment on First Amendment grounds. The district court
a See id. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 3 (1999)
(Conf. Rep.)).
32 18 U.S.C. § 48 (c)(1), supra at n. 6.
33 Id.
M See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 1887 (Dec. 9,
1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 324.
* Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.
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denied the motion, holding that the targeted depictions were cate-
gorically unprotected by the First Amendment. The jury convicted
Stevens and the district court sentenced him to 37 months' imprison-
ment followed by three years of supervised release.36 The en banc
Third Circuit declared the statute facially unconstitutional and
vacated Stevens's conviction.37
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's judgment, but on
different grounds. Although both the Third Circuit and the Supreme
Court rejected the government's argument that the targeted depic-
tions should be categorically unprotected by the First Amendment,38
from that point on their analyses diverged. The Third Circuit con-
cluded that Section 48 could not survive the strict scrutiny to which
it was subject as a content-based regulation of protected speech. 39
While the Third Circuit observed in a footnote that the statute "might
also be unconstitutionally overbroad," it did not resolve this issue."
In contrast, the Supreme Court did not subject Section 48 to strict
scrutiny, but rather struck it down as substantially overbroad
because its "presumptively impermissible applications . . . far out-
number any permissible ones." 4' The government could not deny
that, as written, Section 48 did literally apply to many depictions
beyond the only two kinds that, the government maintained, it
should be construed to outlaw: crush videos and depictions of animal
fighting. The government sought to defend against the facial over-
breadth challenge by urging the Court to construe the statute more
narrowly than it was written in several respects.
For example, although Section 48 expressly targets "depiction[s]
of animal cruelty," it criminalized depictions of any "wounding"
or "killing" of an animal that was illegal for any reason, even reasons
having nothing to do with protecting animals against cruelty. There-
fore, as mentioned above, Section 48 outlawed depictions of gener-
ally lawful activities such as hunting, fishing, slaughtering livestock,
1 Id. Thirteen judges participated in the decision; ten joined in the majority ruling,
and three dissented. See Stevens, 533 F. 3d at 236 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
* Stevens, 533 F.3d at 220.
* Id.; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
* Stevens, 533 F.3d at 232-33.
oId. at 235 n.16.
41 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
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and exterminating pests, if the particular activity depicted did not
comply with regulations designed to promote various interests, such
as human health and environmental concerns. In an effort to avert
the resulting overbreadth, the government argued that the Court
should read into the statutory language an additional requirement
that there be "accompanying acts of cruelty."'
Another aspect of Section 48 that the government urged the Court
to read more narrowly than written was its exception for "any
depiction that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational,
journalistic, historical, or artistic value." The government apparently
recognized that this exception would not necessarily shelter the
hunting depictions that, it maintained, the statute did not intend to
target, because such depictions would not necessarily be found to
have "serious value." 2 Therefore, the government asked the Court
to interpret the "serious value" requirement as meaning "at least
some minimal value" or value that is not "scant," even though at
trial the government had endorsed the jury instructions on point,
which required value that is "significant and of great import."'
Likewise, the government asked the Court to read into Section 48
a requirement that the value of any targeted depiction must be
"determined based on an assessment of the work as a whole,"145
even though Section 48 refers to "any . .. depiction," including "any
photograph" or "electronic image," and even though the govern-
ment's own expert witnesses supported their arguments that Ste-
vens's videos lacked sufficient value by focusing on brief segments. 6
In sum, as the Court concluded, the government was asking it not
to construe the statute, but rather to rewrite it.47
42 Id. at 1588.
* See Reply Brief for the United States, supra note 13, at 5-6 (emphasis added) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 397, at 24-5, 31 (1999) (Conf. Rep)).
4 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
s Brief for the United States, supra note 25, at 26; Reply Brief for the United States,
supra note 13, at 6.
46 See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 28, at 8 (detailing how one of the govern-
ment's expert witnesses concluded that one of the three targeted videotapes was
valueless because, in his view, a single one-minute scene in an hour-long movie was
too long).
1 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
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In addition to asking the Court to correct Congress's substantially
overbroad drafting through a judicial rewriting, the government
also asked the Court to rely on the executive branch to achieve the
same result by exercising prosecutorial discretion to enforce the
statute only in cases involving depictions of "'extreme' cruelty."48
This "trust us" argument flies in the face of the most fundamental
constitutional principles that secure First Amendment and other
constitutional freedoms against infringements, rather than relegating
them to the discretion of government officials.49
Moreover, this argument is especially unpersuasive in light of the
Stevens litigation itself. Stevens was prosecuted for selling videos
that contained some footage of pit bulls engaging in dogfights, at
least some of which were apparently legal where and when they
occurred," as well as attacks against other animals. Stevens main-
tained that he had long opposed dogfighting and that these videos
were designed to educate pit bull owners and trainers about the
breed's special strengths and qualities that make it well-suited for
non-dogfighting activities such as hunting, tracking, and weight
pulling." At trial, several expert witnesses attested to the serious
value in each of these films. Notably, one such expert was the acting
vice president of the American Canine Foundation, which works
to end animal cruelty.52 This expert testimony highlighted several
valuable aspects of the films, including their educational value for
law enforcement officials who regularly work with or encounter pit
bulls.' In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that
these videos could fairly be considered to comply with the govern-
ment's malleable proposed criterion of depicting "extreme cruelty,"
they are certainly excluded by the additional limiting construction
that President Clinton announced when he signed Section 48, confin-
ing it to depictions that are "designed to appeal to a prurient interest
in sex."'
4 Id. at 1581.
4 See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1947).
" Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.
s See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 28, at 58-59.
52See American Canine Foundation home page,
http://www.americancaninefoundation.com.
* See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 28, at 7.
See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 1887, supra note 34.
76
Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based Speech Restrictions
The Supreme Court's sole dissenter, Justice Samuel Alito, criti-
cized the majority for invalidating the statute on facial grounds,
rather than confining its review to the statute as applied to the
particular videotapes at issue." Justice Alito then analyzed the stat-
ute as if it had actually outlawed only crush videos and videos
of "brutal animal fights."6 Accepting the government's proffered
analogy to child pornography, Justice Alito concluded that both
types of depictions should be excluded from First Amendment pro-
tection because the crimes they depict "cannot be effectively con-
trolled without targeting the videos.""
II. The Importance of the General Prohibition on Content-Based
Speech Regulations-and the Exceptions to That Prohibition
The Supreme Court has stressed that "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expres-
sion because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its con-
tent."" In recent decades, the Court has consistently held that con-
tent-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitu-
tional." Notwithstanding this cardinal general rule, the Court has
held that content-based speech restrictions are permissible in two
situations. First, the Court has recognized a series of content-based
categorical exceptions to First Amendment coverage, categories of
expression that it has deemed wholly outside the First Amendment's
scope. Once expression is held to satisfy the defining criteria for any
such categorical exclusion-for example, the tripartite definition of
constitutionally unprotected "obscenity"60-the First Amendment
analysis ends; government is free to regulate or even prohibit such
categorically unprotected expression.1 Second, the Court has held
that even expression that is within the First Amendment's scope-
6 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1593 (Alito, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 1601.
57
Id.
58 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
19 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 932-33 (3d
ed. 2006).
60 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
61 See Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 986. The Court has held, however, that even
concerning categorically unprotected expression, regulations may not discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
77
CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW
that is, it does not satisfy the criteria for any categorical exception-
may still be subject to content-based regulation if the government
can satisfy "strict judicial scrutiny" by showing that the regulation
is "narrowly tailored" and necessary to advance a goal of "compel-
ling" importance, such that no "less restrictive alternative" measure
would suffice.62
In light of the fundamental First Amendment concerns underlying
the general proscription on content-based regulations, it is important
to constrain the two exceptional situations in which they are nonethe-
less tolerated. The Supreme Court's Stevens opinion constitutes a
significant step toward reining in the first such exception: categorical
content-based exclusions from First Amendment protection. Specifi-
cally, the Court reformulated the passage from Chaplinsky that had
initially described the Court's approach to such exclusions. The Ste-
vens litigation also provides support for reining in the second excep-
tion, for regulations that the government can demonstrate to satisfy
strict scrutiny. In particular, the Third Circuit's opinion, which
reviewed Section 48 under strict scrutiny, rejected the government's
drying-up-the-market rationale that the Supreme Court had vali-
dated in Ferber in the child pornography context. Moreover,
although the Supreme Court did not engage in strict scrutiny analy-
sis because of its substantial overbreadth holding, what it said about
Ferber indicates that the Court will likely continue to construe that
case narrowly-making it difficult to extend Ferber's rationale
beyond the "special case" of child sexual abuse and child
pornography."4
62 See Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 986-87, 1005-06.
6 See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Stevens,
130 S. Ct. 1577, 1583-84 (2010); but see Stevens, 533 F.3d at 245-46 (Cowen, J.,
dissenting) ("Congress could have thus reasonably concluded that targeting the
distributors would be the most effective way of drying up the animal-cruelty depic-
tions market"); Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1601-02 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("In short, because
videos depicting live dogfights are essential to the success of the criminal dogfighting
subculture, the commercial sale of such videos helps to fuel the market for, and thus
to perpetuate the perpetration of, the criminal conduct depicted in them.").
I See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 ("We made clear that Ferber presented a special case.").
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III. Putting the Lid on Content-Based Categories of Unprotected
Speech
A. Contrast between Key Passages in Chaplinsky and Stevens
Regarding Categorical First Amendment Exceptions
The U.S. government's primary argument in Stevens was that the
depictions Section 48 outlawed should be added to the few categories
of expression that the Court has held to be excluded from First
Amendment protection." The rationale for this conclusion would
have warranted wide-ranging suppression of any controversial or
extreme expression. The government maintained that "[wihether a
given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection
depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech
against its societal costs."66 The Court rejected this argument in
unusually strong language as "startling and dangerous."67 Nonethe-
less, the trial court had accepted this very argument, as did the three
dissenting Third Circuit judges, and the Supreme Court recognized
that it was derived from a widely quoted passage in Chaplinsky,
which first explicated the Court's approach to categorically unpro-
tected expression.8
In the Stevens litigation, the government had relied on the broadest
language in Chaplinsky's pertinent passage to support its request
that the Court carve out from the First Amendment a new category
of unprotected expression. In contrast, the Stevens Court treated that
language as dicta and instead focused on narrower language in the
Chaplinsky passage, which it integrated into an updated statement
of the pertinent principles concerning categorically unprotected
expression. That updated statement also drew on several of the
6s See Brief for the United States, supra note 25, at 9-14.
66 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (citing Brief for the United States, supra note 25, at 8).
67 Id. The government also proffered other arguments, which the Court did not
address, that were at least as deserving of this strong critique. For example, the
government argued that "Section 48 furthers the substantial interest in preventing
the erosion of public morality that attends" the depicted acts. Brief for the United
States, supra note 25, at 34. Another example is the government's argument that the
targeted depictions could be criminalized under an expanded concept of constitution-
ally unprotected obscenity, as material that is "depraved and loathsome to the senses."
Id. at 37.
68 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
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Court's post-Chaplinsky rulings, which had sharply curtailed Chaplin-
sky's speech-suppressive slant. The Stevens reformulation transforms
Chaplinsky's broad invitation to recognize unprotected categories of
expression into strictly limited preconditions for doing so.
The pertinent, often quoted Chaplinsky passage reads:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.69
In contrast, Stevens's corresponding passage draws very selectively
from this Chaplinsky excerpt, quoting only the italicized language
near its beginning, while also drawing on post-Chaplinsky decisions
that are much more speech-protective:o
"From 1791 to the present," . .. the First Amendment has
"permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
limited areas," . . . These "historic and traditional categories
long familiar to the bar," including obscenity, defamation,
fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct,
are "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem."71
Although both the Chaplinsky and Stevens passages acknowledge
that there are some content-based categorical exceptions to First
6 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (emphasis added).
70 This central passage in Stevens quotes the following post-Chaplinsky decisions that
expanded free speech protection beyond what the Court had recognized when it
decided Chaplinsky: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
71 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
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Amendment protection, they reflect dramatically different perspec-
tives on the appropriate criteria for identifying those exceptions.72
The Stevens approach is essentially backward-looking, treating the
finite exceptions that had been generally accepted since the First
Amendment's adoption as a closed, fixed set of all such exceptions.
In contrast, Chaplinsky invites the very argument that the government
made in Stevens: that the Court may now and in the future continue
the process of recognizing potentially unlimited new categories of
unprotected expression, beyond those with a longstanding historical
pedigree, so long as the Court deems the expression at issue to fail
the open-ended, subjective balancing test that the last sentence of
the Chaplinsky passage sets out.
Accordingly, in the Stevens litigation, the government argued that
the targeted depictions of illegal treatment of animals should consti-
tute categorically unprotected expression because they are "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas" and "of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity."" The Stevens opinion acknowledged, "[tlo be fair to the Govern-
ment," that past decisions had quoted this language from Chaplinsky
with apparent approval.'
The Stevens Court went on to impose an important limitation on
the significance of this language, however, by stressing that it was
only "descriptive," merely describing the "historically unprotected
categories of speech."" The Stevens Court emphatically rejected any
reading of this language as normative, declaring that it does "not
set forth a test that may be applied as a general matter to permit
72 Both Chaplinsky and Stevens list particular examples of categorically unprotected
expression, and neither purports to provide a full roster. Nonetheless, it is interesting
to contrast these (partial) lists. The only two categories that both cases cite are obscenity
and defamation. The Stevens list omits several categories that Chaplinsky had specified
as unprotected: "lewd" speech, "profane" speech, and "insulting or 'fighting' words."
These omissions are consistent with post-Chaplinsky rulings that have effectively
removed these categories from the unprotected list. Conversely, the Stevens listing
of unprotected categories adds several others that the Chaplinsky roster had not
included: fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct. See Stevens,
130 S. Ct. at 1584.
" Brief for the United States, supra note 25, at 11-12.
74 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
75 Id.
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the Government to imprison any speaker so long as his speech is
deemed valueless or unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus
of costs and benefits tilts in a statute's favor."'
Stevens did not rule out the possibility that the Court could in the
future recognize a category of "historically unprotected" expression
that had "not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such
in our case law."" The Court did foreclose, however, the possibility
of carving out from First Amendment protection any expression
that had been protected historically. The Court flatly rejected the
government's contention "that categories of speech may be
exempted from the First Amendment's protection without any long-
settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation." And Ste-
vens's Supreme Court brief persuasively explained why this "histori-
cally unprotected" criterion is dictated by the First Amendment's
text and purpose:
[The] focus on history and tradition is critical because it
ensures that the First Amendment's shield is withheld only
from those narrow categories of speech for which the Consti-
tution itself never intended protection, but not from those
forms of speech that the legislative majority just prefers not to
protect. Protection against legislative hostility or constantly
shifting public sentiment is, after all, the whole purpose of
the First Amendment.79
As indicated by the Stevens passage quoted above, the Court read
two phrases in the corresponding Chaplinsky passage as setting out
essential prerequisites for any newly stated recognition of another
longstanding content-based First Amendment carve-out. First, the
exception must be "historic and traditional," a test that the Stevens
Court indicated it would construe narrowly. It signaled that any
such exception must extend from 1791 to the present. Moreover, the
sole sentence that the Court approvingly quoted from Chaplinsky
stated that any such exception has "never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem."" If these requirements are enforced
76
1 Id. at 1586.
77 Id.
78
1 Id. at 1585.
7 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 28, at 15.
a Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
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strictly, it is hard to imagine any future expansion of the list of
unprotected speech categories beyond those the Court has pre-
viously recognized. At the very least, this criterion would bar recog-
nition of any admittedly new categorical exceptions to the First
Amendment that various advocates have proposed: for example, for
"hate speech" that expresses discriminatory views on the basis of
race, religion, gender, and other personal characteristics;"' or "por-
nography" that is "demeaning" or "degrading" to women.82
The second phrase from Chaplinsky that the Stevens Court approv-
ingly quotes as a prerequisite for recognizing any newly identified
category of historically unprotected speech refers to such First
Amendment exceptions as "well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech."" This second prerequisite also serves as a signifi-
cant check upon the Court's recognition of new categories of unpro-
tected speech content. It requires that any alleged historical exception
for certain expression would have to be demonstrated at a narrow
level of specificity, rather than at a higher level of abstraction. For
example, in Stevens the government could not rely on the longstand-
ing obscenity exception, as it sought to do, by describing that excep-
tion at a relatively high level of abstraction; the government
described the obscenity exception as encompassing expression that
"offends the sensibilities of most citizens,"' and thus includes depic-
tions of animal cruelty. In contrast, the Stevens decision noted the
government's failure to produce any evidence about any historic
lack of protection for the particular depictions that Section 48 sought
to suppress."
Stevens's refusal to recognize any novel additions to the traditional
roster of unprotected categories of expression was ratified by the
Court's subsequent decision in another free speech case during its
2009-10 term, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project."6 To be sure, the
majority rejected the particular First Amendment claim in that case;
8 See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, et al., Words that Wound (1993).
82 See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1991); Andrea
Dworkin & Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for
Women's Equality (1988).
83 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
84 Brief for the United States, supra note 25, at 37.
85 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
86 559 U.S.-, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
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the plaintiffs had challenged a federal statute that criminalized the
"knowing" provision of "material support" to "foreign terrorist
organizations" insofar as it barred them from providing training
and engaging in advocacy in support of peaceful, humanitarian
goals. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the Court did not accept
the government's suggestion that the expression at issue should be
treated as categorically unprotected." Instead, the Court subjected
the statute, as applied to plaintiffs' expression, to strict scrutiny.8
Moreover, the dissenting justices expressly cited Stevens in stressing
that plaintiffs' expression was not "deprive[d] ... of First Amend-
ment protection under any traditional 'categorical' exception to its
protection."89
B. Stevens's Recharacterization of Ferber's Child Pornography
Exception, Limiting Its Potential as a Model for Future New
Exceptions
The Court's effort in Stevens to limit categories of unprotected
expression to the finite set that it has historically recognized is under-
scored by Stevens's novel characterization of the child pornography
exception to First Amendment protection." That exception, which
the Court initially recognized in Ferber, is invariably described as the
Court's most recent addition to the list of content-based categories of
unprotected expression. For example, this description was used even
by Stevens's own Supreme Court brief" and by the Third Circuit,92
although they both read Ferber narrowly in other respects. The Ferber
Court's own language was certainly consistent with this reading.
For example, the Court said that it was "[riecognizing and classifying
" Id. at 2724 n.5 ("We do not consider any such argument because the Government
does not develop it."). Stevens would require any "developed" argument in support
of this point to demonstrate that the expression was within a "well-defined and
narrowly limited class of speech, the prevention and punishment of which [has]
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
Accordingly, the fact that the Court did not view the government's argument on
this point in Holder as sufficiently "develop[ed]" is consistent with Stevens's strict
specification of the necessary showings to do so.
* Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
8 Id. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
* See Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
91 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 28, at 15-16.
92533 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2008).
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child pornography as a category of material outside the protection
of the First Amendment."93
In contrast, the Supreme Court's Stevens opinion did not acknowl-
edge that the Court had recognized child pornography as a new
category of unprotected expression. To the contrary, the Stevens
Court treated child pornography as a specific example of a long-
standing more general category of unprotected expression, citing a
case that had recognized this broader excluded category just five
years after Chaplinsky. Specifically, Stevens assimilated child pomog-
raphy to the traditionally unprotected category of "speech integral
to criminal conduct," citing the 1947 case of Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co.' The Court quoted language in Ferber itself, as well as its
two major subsequent decisions concerning child pornography,"
which stressed that "[t]he market for child pornography was 'intrin-
sically related' to the underlying abuse, and was therefore 'an inte-
gral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal
throughout the Nation."'96
Given Stevens's recasting of child pornography as a newly identi-
fied example of "a previously recognized, long-established category
of unprotected speech,"9 7 rather than a newly minted category, Ferber
has only limited capacity to serve as a springboard for judicial recog-
nition of additional categories of unprotected expression, which is
how the U.S. government and other proponents of Section 48 had
invoked it. In the wake of Stevens, Ferber cannot serve as precedent
for creating a new category of unprotected expression, but rather
11 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763. See also id. at 764 (referring to child pornography as "a
definable class of material . . . that . .. is . . . without the protection of the First
Amendment.").
I Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (citing Giboney, 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)). For a critique
of Giboney, as well as Ferber, see Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally
Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and
the Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1324-25 (2005).
11 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249-50 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
96 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (citing Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498). In the same vein, during
the oral argument in Stevens, Justice Scalia twice referred to child pornography as a
subspecies of the longstanding obscenity exception, thus also not acknowledging it
as a distinct new category of unprotected expression. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 8-9, 21, Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08-769).
97 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
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only for identifying a new, specific subset of a traditional, historical
exception. In particular, Stevens stressed that child pornography was
"integrally related" to the underlying crime of child sexual abuse
because of the drying-up-the-market rationale. Therefore, if this
rationale could be extended to other expression, one could argue that
such other expression should likewise fall within the longstanding
categorical exception for speech that is "an integral part of [the
criminal] conduct" it depicts."
However, the Court has consistently resisted attempts to extend
the drying-up-the-market rationale beyond the specific context of
child pornography.99 For example, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,00 the Court
held that the First Amendment barred any penalty on media for
disclosing a cell phone conversation that another party had illegally
intercepted in violation of wiretapping laws. The proponents of
penalizing the media argued that it was difficult to enforce direct
prohibitions on wiretapping and therefore that it was necessary and
appropriate to "dry up the market" for the fruits of such illegal
interceptions by penalizing the media for disclosing them. The Court
emphatically rejected this argument, and indicated that Ferber's dry-
ing-up-the-market rationale may well be confined to the "special
case" of child pornography.o' The drying-up-the-market rationale
98 Id. In Ferber itself, the Court explained this general rationale as follows: "The
advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and
are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal
throughout the Nation." 458 U.S. at 761-62. The Ferber Court then quoted the very
passage from Giboney that the Supreme Court quoted in Stevens. Id.
I See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 936 (2001)
(child pornography "is the only place in First Amendment law where the Supreme
Court has accepted the idea that we can constitutionally criminalize the depiction
of a crime.").
1- 532 U.S. 514 (2001). See also Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 254 (rejecting the
drying-up-the-market rationale as a sufficient justification for outlawing "virtual
child pornography," which is produced without using actual children); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,567-68 (1969) (rejecting the state's argument that its prohibition
on possessing obscenity was a necessary complement to its prohibition on distribut-
ing obscenity).
101 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
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for punishing expression that depicts or results from illegal conduct
also has been criticized by individual justices102 and by scholars.'
C. Stevens's Criteria for Identifying Categorical First Amendment
Exceptions: Comparisons and Contrasts to Other Constitutional Law
Contexts
As discussed above, the two criteria that Stevens endorses for
identifying any category of unprotected expression are that such
category is (1) grounded in history and tradition and (2) "well-
defined and narrowly limited." These two criteria also have been
used by the Court in another important constitutional context: to
identify rights that are sufficiently "fundamental" to be deemed
implicitly protected under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments as a matter of "substantive due process." "
Somewhat ironically, the justices who have most consistently
stressed these prerequisites for recognizing a new substantive due
process right are the justices who generally take the narrowest view
of such rights-notably, on the current Court, Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas.' In the substantive due process context,
102 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 145 n.19 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
notion that possession of pornography may be penalized in order to facilitate a
prohibition on its production ... is not unlike a proposal that newspaper subscribers
be held criminally liable for receiving the newspaper if they are aware of the publish-
er's violations of child labor laws.").
103 See Volokh, supra note 94, at 1324-26 (criticizing Giboney, Ferber, Osborne and the
drying-up-the-market rationale, noting that "When the New York Times publishes
illegally leaked documents, or transcripts of an illegally [intercepted] conversation,
it would have a strong First Amendment defense . . . even though the prospect of
such publication may provide a motive for the illegal leaks or illegal interception.").
See also Adler, supra note 99, at 970-93 ("Child pornography law has validated a
renegade vision of how speech works. It is a vision that we have rejected in every
other First Amendment context. Child pornography law has collapsed the 'speech/
action' distinction that occupies a central role in First Amendment law.").
1 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21(1997) (citations omitted):
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary
features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause spe-
cially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' . . . . Second, we have
required . .. a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.
105 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,588 (2003) (Scalia, J., with whom Thomas,
J., and Rehnquist, C.J., join, dissenting) ("Washington v. Glucksberg . . . held that only
fundamental rights which are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'
87
CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW
strictly enforcing these prerequisites for recognizing an implicit right
has the effect of limiting the protection for the constitutional right
at issue. In stark contrast, in the First Amendment context, strictly
enforcing these same prerequisites for recognizing a categorical
exemption from the right has the opposite effect: to maximize protec-
tion for the constitutional right at issue.
Stevens's strict reliance on history and tradition constitutes an
unusual twist on such sources of constitutional interpretation even
in the specific context of identifying categorical exemptions from
First Amendment protection. Typically, a judge who invokes history
and tradition in this context does so in support of limiting First
Amendment protection."o6 That is exactly the purpose for which the
key Chaplinsky passage itself invoked history and tradition: Chaplin-
sky's specific holding was to reject a First Amendment challenge
to a conviction for expressing provocative religious and political
opinions because of the historically enshrined "fighting words"
exception to free speech.o' Therefore, it is noteworthy that the Stevens
Court turns that typical use of history and tradition on its head, and
converts it into a criterion that forestalls limits on First Amend-
ment protection.
This situation illustrates how overly simplistic it is to equate a
particular approach to constitutional interpretation, such as original-
ism, with a particular ideology or result.08 That oversimplified equa-
tion was likewise belied by another decision that the Court issued
qualify for anything other than rational basis scrutiny under the doctrine of 'substan-
tive due process."') (citations omitted).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008) ("offers to engage in
illegal transactions"); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam) (intentional
incitement of imminent illegal conduct); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964) (defamation); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957)
(obscenity).
107 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569 (Chaplinsky, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
said the following to a city marshal: "You are a God damned racketeer" and "a
damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of
Fascists.").
10 See generally Jeffrey Rosen, Conservatives v. Originalism, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 465 (1996) (arguing that certain justices who generally adhere to originalism
nonetheless choose not to analyze three issues with that approach-race-conscious
voting districts, gay rights, and minority set-asides-because the results conflict with
their conservative political beliefs). Major constitutional law cases illustrate that the
same general historical, originalist approach can well yield very different conclusions.
See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036-42 (2010) (concluding
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during its 2009-10 term, which also illustrates the Court's longstand-
ing reliance on the history and tradition criterion it stressed in Stevens
in yet another important constitutional law context. Specifically,
McDonald v. City of Chicago invoked that established criterion for
determining whether a right that is set out in the Bill of Rights (and
hence directly constrains the federal government) should also be
deemed to be "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment-
and thus also enforceable against state and local governments0 o9
McDonald posed this question concerning the Second Amendment
right that the Court had recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller,'10
the right to keep and bear arms in the home for the purpose of self-
defense. In McDonald, the Court divided 5-4 along "conservative"
and "liberal" lines,' with the justices who are generally considered
more conservative concluding that the right at issue was enforceable
against state and local governments,112 and the justices considered
more liberal reaching the opposite conclusion.'13 This alignment con-
stitutes a reversal of the typical roles in incorporation debates.
that the Constitution's Framers and ratifiers considered the individual right to bear
arms "among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty");
see also id. at 3111-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the individual
right to bear arms is rooted in history and tradition, but concluding that the states'
right to restrict gun ownership is a far "older and more deeply rooted tradition").
109 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
110 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
I put these words in quotation marks to flag how inaccurate and oversimplified they
are. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, So What's the 'Right' Pick?, N.Y.Times, July 3, 2005, at 41.
112 Justice Thomas agreed with the conclusion, supported by four other justices, that
"the Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to keep and bear arms set forth in the
Second Amendment 'fully applicable to the States."' McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058-59
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas also
concurred in some portions of the Court's analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. However, Justice Thomas rested his conclusion on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id. at 3059. The justices who squarely
concluded that the right at issue should be incorporated via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause were Justice Alito (who authored the mixed majority/
plurality opinion), Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy.
113 Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, id. at 3088, and Justice Breyer filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined, id. at 3120.
Indicative of the role reversal, Justice Stevens urged the Court to reverse "some
1960's opinions," noting that "[t]he Court has not hesitated to cut back on perceived
Warren Court excesses."). Id. at 3095 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 501 (noting that the debate about
incorporation "determined the reach of the Bill of Rights and the extent to which
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IV. Confining the Drying-Up-the-Market Rationale to the Child
Pornography Context
As Part III explained, in Stevens the Supreme Court recast its Ferber
decision as having been squarely grounded in the longstanding
categorical First Amendment exclusion of expression that is "an
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.""
In the Ferber case, the particular "integral" relationship between the
expressive material at issue-child pornography-and the underly-
ing criminal conduct-sexual abuse of children-was the fact that
the criminal conduct was carried out in order to generate the expres-
sive material, thus leading to the "drying up the market" rationale.
The Ferber opinion elaborated on that rationale as follows:
[T]he distribution network for child pornography must be
closed if the production of material which requires the sexual
exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled. Indeed,
there is no serious contention that the legislature was unjusti-
fied in believing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to halt
the exploitation of children by pursuing only those who
produce the photographs and movies. While the production
of pornographic materials is a low-profile, clandestine indus-
try, the need to market the resulting products requires a
visible apparatus of distribution. The most expeditious if not
the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry
up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal
penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise pro-
moting the product."'
In Ferber the Court also cited three additional rationales in support
of its conclusion that child pornography is beyond the First Amend-
ment pale:'
individuals could turn to the federal courts for protection from state and local
governments.").
11s Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
116 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759-60.
117 The Ferber Court listed various "reasons" why government is "entitled to greater
leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children," 458 U.S. at 756,
and it then discussed several reasons, numbering them "First" through "Fifth." Id.
at 756-64. However, the Court's numbering is confusing because it does not strictly
correspond to the distinct rationales that the Court proffers in support of its conclusion
concerning child pornography, in several respects. Of most relevance, the Court's
discussion of what it labels its "second" reason actually addresses two distinct ra-
tionales, one of which is the "drying up the market theory," id. at 759-60, which the
Court also discussed under what it labeled its "third" reason, id. at 761-62. Moreover,
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1. The goal that the statute was designed to serve, preventing
the sexual abuse of children, is of exceptionally compelling
importance."'
2. Child pornography constitutes a permanent record of the sexual
abuse to which the child was subject, and the child suffers
continuing harm from its circulation.1
3. The targeted expression has only "exceedingly modest, if not
de minimis" value. 120
In the Stevens litigation, as well as in other cases, advocates of
content-based regulations of expression other than child pornogra-
phy have relied on the rationales the Court set out in Ferber in two
ways. First, they cite one or more of Ferber's rationales as supporting
the recognition of additional categorical exclusions from the First
Amendment. Second, as a fallback position, they cite one or more
of these rationales as satisfying judicial strict scrutiny. Now that the
Court's Stevens ruling has specified two quite narrow criteria for
identifying content-based categorical exclusions from free speech
protection, as Part III discussed, most of the Ferber rationales will
henceforth save a content-based speech regulation only if these ra-
tionales satisfy strict scrutiny.121 This is unlikely to occur.
In Ferber itself, the Court did not subject the challenged statute to
strict scrutiny, given the Court's holding that child pornography,
which the statute outlawed, was categorically unprotected expres-
sion. Therefore, even though the Ferber Court endorsed the rationales
it articulated as generally supporting its conclusion that child por-
nography constitutes categorically unprotected expression, the
Court might well find that not all these rationales are sufficiently
the Court designates as its "fifth" reason the general proposition that its past decisions
have recognized certain content-based categorical exclusions from free speech protec-
tion, id. at 763-64, which of course provides no logical support for the specific
proposition that child pornography should constitute such an exclusion.
11 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-58.
1 Id. at 759.
120 Id. at 762.
121 Additionally, as discussed above, Ferber's drying-up-the-market rationale could
potentially support an argument that another category of expression should also be
recognized, along with child pornography, as a specific instance of the general,
historically recognized categorical exclusion for expression that is "integrally related"
to illegal conduct. Accordingly, that particular Ferber rationale could potentially sup-
port a claim for a newly recognized categorical exclusion.
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persuasive to withstand strict scrutiny when offered to support other
censorial measures, including Section 48.
To be sure, the Court will always hold that protecting children's
welfare-which closely corresponds to one of its Ferber rationales-
is a goal of compelling importance. That said, the Ferber Court under-
standably accorded extraordinary importance to the more specific
child protection goal it stressed, of protecting children from sexual
abuse. Therefore, one could plausibly argue that any content-based
regulation that was designed to promote any other goal-even any
other goal concerning children's welfare-could be distinguished
from Ferber on this basis. In Ferber, the Court described the specific
objective of protecting children from sexual abuse as being "of sur-
passing importance,"1 a phrase that adds a special emphasis, in
contrast with the usual strict scrutiny parlance, which refers to a
goal of "compelling" importance.12
The Third Circuit's opinion in Stevens stresses this unique aspect
of Ferber and concludes that the Ferber Court was willing to accept
the drying-up-the-market rationale as a sufficient justification for
criminalizing depictions of criminal conduct only in that specific
context,12 4 given the particular heinousness of the crime.125 Indeed,
the Supreme Court itself has said that "the interests underlying child
pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying" an anti-
obscenity law, even though obscenity is a more longstanding excep-
tion to First Amendment protection than child pornography.'26
122 458 U.S. at 757.
12 The Ferber Court also indicated that it might well be uniquely deferential to govern-
ment power to regulate child pornography when it contrasted the traditional obscenity
exception with its newly recognized child pornography exception; it said that "the
States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of
children." Id. at 756.
124 See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 226 ("assum[es]," for the sake of argument only, that
"Ferber may, in limited circumstances . . . be applied to other categories of speech").
125 See id. at 228 (noting that in Ferber, "the Supreme Court went to great lengths to
cabin its discussion of the depiction/act conflation because of the special role that
children play in our society."). See also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (attributing what he views as the Court's deviation from First Amendment
principles and precedents, in upholding a law criminalizing the mere possession of
child pornography, to the fact that "the Court . . . is so disquieted by the possible
exploitation of children in the production of ... pornography.").
126 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108.
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In the same vein, the Supreme Court has also distinguished child
pornography from other expression, including even constitutionally
unprotected obscenity, in terms of another rationale it stressed in
Ferber: that the targeted expression has only "exceedingly modest,
if not de minimis value."'27 By definition, obscenity lacks "serious
... value."1' Therefore, the Court's indication that child pornogra-
phy has even less "value" than obscenity 29 signals that the Court
has relegated child pornography to a singularly outcast status in
this regard. Consequently, the Court is unlikely to conclude that
any other expression, other than child pornography, has such mini-
mal value.
In sum, building on the Third Circuit's analysis in Stevens, one
could argue that the drying-up-the-market rationale for punishing
expression in order to deter unlawful conduct should be confined
only to the child pornography context because of two unique factors
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed: (1) the "surpassing
importance" of protecting children from sexual abuse and (2) child
pornography's especially de minimis value. Some commentators have
read Ferber and the Court's other child pornography cases in this
strictly limited fashion.'
127 Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759).
128 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973) (explaining that this is one of the three
prerequisites for expression to be deemed "obscene" and hence excluded from the
First Amendment).
129 Osborne distinguished the Court's holding in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969),
in which it had struck down a statute outlawing the private possession of obscene
material; in contrast, Osborne itself rejected a First Amendment challenge to a statute
outlawing the private possession of child pornography. In support of this distinction,
Osborne stressed that "Stanley was a narrow holding, . . . and, since the decision
in that case, the value of permitting child pornography has been characterized as
'exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.'" 495 U.S. at 108 (quoting Ferber).
13o When the Court issued its Ferber decision, at least one commentary urged that its
drying-up-the-market rationale, which was then a novel justification for a censorial
measure, should be strictly limited to the child pornography context. See Child
Pornography and Unprotected Speech, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 141, 148 (1982). This commen-
tary recognized, however, that the Ferber opinion did not itself explicitly spell out such
a limitation, thus making it a potential foundation for additional speech-suppressive
measures. See id. at 150 ("[T]he Ferber opinion emerges as a sympathetic response
to piteous exploitation. The decision represents the confluence of three concerns-
sexually explicit speech, child welfare, and illegal conduct-and should be viewed
as a narrow decision legitimized only because of that convergence. The Court's failure
to articulate any such limitation, however, leaves each of the three lines of analysis
precariously susceptible to extension in future First Amendment decisions."). See
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Even if the government can show that a content-based speech
regulation is designed to promote a sufficiently important purpose,
it is always harder for the government to satisfy the second prong
of the strict scrutiny test, which requires that the challenged measure
is narrowly tailored and necessary to promote the government's
goal, and that no alternative measure, less restrictive of expression,
will suffice. In particular, in Stevens and other cases concerning
different content-based speech regulations, proponents of such regu-
lations have invoked Ferber's central rationale and argued that the
speech regulations are necessary to promote the government's goal
of deterring certain conduct, due to the difficulties of directly prose-
cuting the conduct itself.
Under strict scrutiny, the government cannot justify suppressing
speech that depicts criminal conduct merely by asserting that it is
difficult to prosecute the underlying conduct, or that prosecuting
the depictions would have some additional impact in deterring the
criminal conduct above and beyond direct prosecutions of such
conduct.' If such assertions could justify a speech-suppressive mea-
sure, then the government could outlaw almost any depictions of
any crime.132 Instead, though, the Supreme Court has rejected this
drying-up-the-market rationale for targeting any expression other
than child pornography. If this rationale were to survive strict scru-
tiny, which it did not have to do in the child pornography context,
the government would have to demonstrate the following support-
ing facts:
also Geoffrey R. Stone, Dog-Fighting and the First Amendment, Huffington Post,
April25,2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/dog-fighting-and-
the-first-amendment (describing as "a . . .basic principle of First Amendment doc-
trine" that "even though speech was produced by an unlawful act, the speech may
not be restricted for that reason," and says that "child pornography is a unique
exception to [this] principle" because "society has a uniquely 'compelling' interest
in preventing" children from being "forced to engage in actual sexual conduct in
order to produce the expression").
131 In Ferber, the Court explained that it is difficult to enforce laws criminalizing the
production of child pornography because "the production of pornographic materials
is a low-profile, clandestine industry." 458 U.S. at 759-60. However, the same could
be said of essentially all criminal activity.
132 See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 230 ("Restriction of the depiction of almost any activity
can work to dry up, or at least restrain, the activity's market.").
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1. That laws criminalizing the underlying conduct are unusually
difficult to enforce-that is, beyond the usual difficulties that rou-
tinely impede the enforcement of any criminal laws. Conversely, if
these laws are as effective as criminal laws in general, enforcing
them is a less restrictive alternative to suppressing the associated
expression. Moreover, the government would have to show that it
had exhausted alternative measures for increasing the effectiveness
of the laws that criminalize the underlying conduct, including
increasing the penalties for violating them and increasing the
resources allocated to enforcing them.133
2. That the underlying criminal conduct is substantially motivated
by the desire to create the depiction; in other words, if the depictions
were criminalized, the underlying criminal conduct would substan-
tially cease. Conversely, if the underlying criminal conduct would
continue to a significant extent in any event, because there are other
economic or non-economic incentives for engaging in it, then crimi-
nalizing the depictions would not sufficiently promote the goal of
deterring the criminal conduct.
3. That the depictions do not materially aid in law enforcement
efforts to suppress the underlying criminal conduct. Conversely,
if the depictions did materially aid in prosecuting such conduct,
outlawing them would be counterproductive. It might even fail
rational basis review,134 and it would certainly fail strict scrutiny.
Because the Ferber Court did not subject the challenged statute to
strict scrutiny, it did not strictly scrutinize the drying-up-the-market
rationale, even in the special context of child pornography. To the
contrary, the Court applied only deferential, rational basis review.
It did not demand actual empirical evidence that criminalizing child
pornography was the only means by which to prevent the underly-
ing child abuse, let alone that criminalization would be effective in
preventing such abuse. Neither did the Court demand any evidence
1I See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,529 (2001) (rejecting argument that expression
that results from illegal conduct should be criminalized in order to deter the illegal
conduct, noting that "[i]f the sanctions that presently attach to a violation of" the
statute making the conduct illegal "do not provide sufficient deterrence, perhaps
those sanctions should be made more severe.").
13 See Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 540 (explaining that under this standard, the
Court will strike down a law if its challenger shows that it has no rational relationship
to a legitimate government purpose).
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of the ineffectiveness of the less restrictive alternative that is typically
used to deter criminal conduct-namely, prosecuting those who
engage in that conduct; in this context, that would mean prosecuting
those who actually abuse children in producing child pornography.
Instead, using classic rational basis review terminology, the Ferber
Court asserted that the legislature was "justified in believing" that
this usual approach for halting illegal conduct would not be suffi-
ciently effective.135 The Court similarly speculated that "[t]he most
expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may
be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal
penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting
the product." 6
Not only did the Ferber majority not cite any empirical evidence
in support of these conclusions, but the empirical evidence it did
cite actually supported a less restrictive alternative to criminalizing
the expression at issue: enforcing obscenity statutes. Justice Stevens's
separate opinion in Ferber stressed this point. Specifically, the very
congressional committee reports that the majority cited had con-
cluded that the problem of child sexual abuse for the purpose of
producing child pornography could be adequately addressed by
imposing stiff penalties for violating obscenity laws, because "virtu-
ally all" child pornography satisfies the standards for constitution-
ally unprotected obscenity.137
In sum, the drying-up-the-market rationale might not satisfy strict
scrutiny even in the unique context of child pornography. That was
one reason for Justice Stevens's conclusion that the Court should
not have treated child pornography as categorically unprotected
expression.'8 It is also one reason why the Ferber decision was strong-
ly criticized by contemporary commentators.139 In any event, regard-
less of whether or not the drying-up-the-market rationale could
135 458 U.S. at 759.
" Id. at 760 (emphasis added). See also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-10 (upholding a
statute that criminalized the mere possession of child pornography under rational
basis review, asserting that "[i]t is ... surely reasonable for the State to conclude that
it will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess
and view the product, thereby decreasing demand.").
117 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 779 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing S. Rep.
No. 95-438, at 13 (1977)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-697, at 7-8 (1977).
13 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A holding that
respondent may be punished for selling these two films does not require us to
conclude that other users of these very same films, or that other motion pictures
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satisfy strict scrutiny in the "special case" of child pornography,140
that rationale is less likely to satisfy strict scrutiny in any other
context, as the Third Circuit explained in detail in its Stevens opinion.
The Third Circuit expressed its deep skepticism toward Ferber's
"conflation of the underlying act with its depiction." 141 It cited NYU
law professor Amy Adler's exhaustive analysis of child pornography
jurisprudence for the proposition that it "is the only place in First
Amendment law where the Supreme Court has accepted the idea
that we can constitutionally criminalize the depiction of a crime."1
The Third Circuit posited that in Ferber the Supreme Court was
willing to "collapse[] the 'speech/action' distinction that occupies
a central role in First Amendment law,"143 because of the unique
importance of protecting children from sexual abuse." In contrast,
even though the goal of preventing cruelty to animals is surely
important, the Third Circuit concluded that neither this goal nor
any other would justify criminalizing depictions in an effort to deter
the underlying conduct, a type of measure that the Court has upheld
only in the context of child pornography.
Strictly scrutinizing the drying-up-the-market rationale that the
government invoked in support of Section 48, the Third Circuit
concluded that it was not narrowly tailored to promote the govern-
ment's asserted goal of preventing cruelty to animals.1" To survive
strict scrutiny, the Third Circuit clarified, the government would
have to show that Section 48 "prevent[s] cruelty to animals that
containing similar scenes, are beyond the pale of constitutional protection.").
Although the Court's judgment in Ferber was unanimous, the majority's opinion only
received a bare five-vote majority. See id. at 774 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result);
Id. at 775 (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., joins, concurring in the judgment); Id.
at 777 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
1I See Adler, supra note 99, at 982 (quoting Supreme Court, 1981 Term, Child Pornogra-
phy and Unprotected Speech, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 141, 148, 150 (1982)); and Frederick
Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev.
285, 303-04).
140 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
141533 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2008).
142 Adler, supra note 99, at 984.
143 Id. at 970.
1" Stevens, 533 F.3d at 228.
145 Id.
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state and federal statutes directly regulating animal cruelty under-
enforce."" 6 As the Supreme Court has stressed, under strict scrutiny
the appropriate inquiry is not whether the challenged measure
advances the government's goal to some marginal extent, but rather
whether it significantly advances the government's goal, above and
beyond other, alternative measures that do not intrude on First
Amendment freedoms.147 This is only logical, as surely every govern-
ment measure, including censorial ones, would have some impact
in promoting the government's goal. If these measures had no impact
whatsoever, they would be struck down as irrational or arbitrary
because they would fail to pass even the highly deferential standard
of rational basis review.
Specifically concerning the government's drying-up-the-market
rationale for Section 48, the Third Circuit noted that the government
had submitted no empirical evidence to substantiate that criminaliz-
ing depictions of the outlawed conduct was effective, let alone that
it was necessary and the least restrictive alternative for significantly
advancing the goal of deterring animal cruelty.1' The Third Circuit
acknowledged that the government made a "plausible" argument
that the perpetrators of animal abuse depicted in crush videos "are
very difficult to find and prosecute for those underlying acts
... because the only person typically onscreen is the 'actress,' and
only her legs or feet are typically shown.""' Accordingly, if the
government could substantiate that argument with evidence,' a
statute that outlawed crush videos might potentially survive strict
" Id (emphasis added).
147 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (explaining that under strict
scrutiny, government must prove that the challenged speech regulation will alleviate
the posited harm "to a material degree").
1s Stevens, 533 F.3d at 230-31.
149 Id. at 229, 234.
15 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) ("The interest in ... freedom of expres-
sion ... outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship."). See also
U.S. v. Williams, 53 U.S. 285, 324-25 & n.3 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
"the Government does not get a free pass whenever it claims a worthy objective for
curtailing speech" and rejecting government's claim that it is necessary to criminalize
offers to sell and solicitations of virtual child pornography because of difficulty
in prosecuting actual child pornography; citing extensive empirical evidence and
concluding that the government "appears to be highly successful in convicting child
pornographers").
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scrutiny. Weighing against this conclusion, though, are the two Fer-
ber rationales that are arguably unique to the child pornography
context, as discussed above: the "surpassing importance" of protect-
ing children from sexual abuse and the de minimis value of child
pornography."' Accordingly, in any other factual context, the Court
might well reject the drying-up-the-market rationale, insisting
instead that government must pursue "[tihe normal method of deter-
ring unlawful conduct," which "is to impose an appropriate punish-
ment on the person who engages in it."152
The Third Circuit expressed even more skepticism about the gov-
ernment's drying-up-the-market rationale as a potential justification
for outlawing dogfighting videos, in contrast to crush videos. Specifi-
cally, the Third Circuit questioned the government's potential ability
to produce empirical evidence that would demonstrate even the
effectiveness, let alone the necessity, of outlawing dogfighting videos
as a means of deterring dogfighting, for several reasons. First, the
Third Circuit cited evidence that most dogfights take place before
live audiences, attracting substantial numbers of spectators who
pay admission fees and generate gambling revenues. In short, the
evidence indicates that producing videos is not the primary eco-
nomic motive for the underlying animal cruelty.'53 Notably, the
Humane Society of the United States, a supporter of Section 48,
attested to these facts.' Second, in contrast to crush videos, animal-
fighting videos apparently do not routinely obscure the identity of
human participants, as indicated by the videos in the Stevens case
itself. The Third Circuit pointed out that these videos made no
attempt to conceal any of the faces of the people depicted, and they
also provided the names and addresses of some participants, as well
as the locations of the depicted activities.' A survey of the success
rates of prosecutions under laws criminalizing dogfighting and other
151 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757, 759.
152 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001).
153 Stevens, 533 F.3d at 230; accord People v. Bergen, 883 P.2d 532, 545 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994) ("[W]ithout the knowing presence of spectators, much of the 'sport' of the
fights would be eliminated.").
15 The Humane Society of the United States, Dogfighting Fact Sheet, available at
http: / /www.hsus.org / hsus_ field / animal fighting the fina l-round!
dogfighting-fact sheet/.
155 Stevens, 533 F.3d at 234.
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kinds of animal fighting concluded that they enjoy a high success
rate."6 Likewise, the director of the Humane Society's campaign
against animal fighting pegged the success rate of federal prosecu-
tions of dogfighting at more than 98 percent."' The government did
not submit any evidence to counter these statistics.
The foregoing points that the Third Circuit cited as weighing
against a drying-up-the-market justification for criminalizing dog-
fighting videos are bolstered by yet another one: that, because dog-
fighting videos do provide identifying information about the
depicted animal abuse, they can be valuable aids for law enforcement
officials in prosecuting and deterring those underlying abuses. The
aforementioned survey of prosecution success rates for animal fight-
ing cases concluded that "[p]rosecutors seem more willing to go
forward when there is videotape evidence, and juries seem more
willing to convict in such cases."" Consequently, criminalizing these
depictions, far from significantly advancing the government's goal
of deterring the underlying conduct, could well undermine that
important goal.
"I Adam Ezra Schulman, Animal-cruelty videos & free speech: some observations
from data, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id= 21814 (July 7,
2009) (citing an overall success rate of 90 percent for prosecutions of all types of
animal fighting).
1s7 See Joe Biddle, Vick Raises Bar on Cruelty, The Tennessean, July 21, 2007. The
overall success rate for criminal prosecution nationwide is not a compiled statistic
but one can find local prosecution rates from city council and district attorney web-
sites. For example, the New York County District Attorney's Office boasts a conviction
rate of "close to 90 percent" since 1980. New York County District Attorney's Office:
History, http://manhattanda.org/officeoverview/history.shtml (last visited July 29,
2010). This rate is consistent with information found for New York County on the
Bureau of Justice Statistics website, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/
Prosecutors/bydiscomp-table.cfm (last visited July 29, 2010). Local prosecution suc-
cess rates can also be gleaned from data in the National Survey of Prosecutors, 2001.
See Carol J. DeFrances, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2001, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, NJC 193441 (2002), available at http:/ /bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/pscOl.pdf. Comparing these separately compiled statistics (with no clear
indication of the time periods they each cover) may well be like comparing apples
and oranges, but at least they indicate that the government will not be able to
demonstrate the necessity of criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty merely by
asserting that prosecuting animal cruelty is unusually difficult.
15 Schulman, supra note 156.
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V. How Would More Narrowly Drafted Statutes, Focusing Only
on Crush andlor Dogfighting Videos, Fare under Stevens's
First Amendment Analysis?
Because Section 48's legislative history focused specifically on
crush videos, and because the government's defense of Section 48
focused only on crush videos plus dogfighting videos, it is worth
considering how the Stevens ruling would bear on any new statute
that criminalized only depictions of these two specific kinds of crimi-
nal activities. Indeed, in the wake of Stevens, legislation along these
narrower contours has been introduced in Congress."' It should also
be recalled that crush videos could well be successfully prosecuted
without any new statute specifically on point, as constituting consti-
tutionally unprotected obscenity.' This part of the article will focus
on other potential bases for concluding that the First Amendment
would permit criminalizing the production of either crush or dog-
fighting videos.
After Stevens, neither type of video could be categorically excluded
from First Amendment protection as independent, stand-alone cate-
gories of unprotected speech. That is because of the Stevens Court's
insistence that it will recognize as categories of unprotected speech
only "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech," which
"[flrom 1791 to the present" have been understood to be excluded
from the First Amendment.'1 As the Court stressed in Stevens, no
such showing could be made concerning the broadly defined depic-
tions of illegal treatment of animals that Section 48 criminalized, 162
and the same is true for these two particular subsets of such
depictions.
Nonetheless, the Court could potentially treat either subset of
depictions the way it treated child pornography in Stevens: as a
specific example of another, more general, historically recognized
category of unprotected expression-namely, expression that is an
1s9 See Animal Torture Prevention Act of 2010, H.R. 5337, 111th Cong., (2d Sess., as
introduced May 18, 2010) (amending 18 U.S.C. Section 48); H.R. 5092, 111th Cong.,
(2d Sess., as introduced Apr. 21, 2010) (amending 18 U.S.C. Section 48) (focusing
exclusively on "animal crush videos").
160 See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 25, at 42-43; see also Brief for the
Respondent, supra note 28, at 50-51.
161 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
162 Id. at 1586.
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integral part of illegal conduct. Stevens stressed that child pornogra-
phy could be subsumed within this general categorical exclusion
because it was "integrally related" to the underlying child abuse
involved in the production process. Accordingly, proponents of
criminalizing crush or dogfighting videos would have to show that
these videos are also "integrally related" to the depicted animal
abuse. The most persuasive showing would be that the abuse takes
place solely-or at least largely-for purposes of generating the
videos. In these situations, drying up the market for the depictions
would completely, or almost completely, end the underlying abuse.
In other words, given the necessary and direct causal connection
that would then exist between the conduct and the expression, sup-
pressing the expression would have a directly proportionate sup-
pressive impact on the conduct.163 One bill that was introduced in
Congress after the Supreme Court's Stevens decision incorporates
this principle. It criminalizes depictions of "extreme animal cruelty"
only if the cruel conduct "is committed for the primary purpose of
creating the depiction."164
Proponents of criminalizing crush videos have maintained that
the animal abuse they depict takes place only for purposes of produc-
ing and selling videos, and that there is no live audience for these
"performances."' 6 If the government could support this contention
through empirical evidence,166 that could be enough to encompass
crush videos within the historic, traditional First Amendment excep-
tion for expression that is an integral aspect of criminal conduct. 6
16 Adler, supra note 99, at 987 (acknowledging, although highly critical of Ferber, that
punishing the production of child pornography could be justified when it "serve[s]
as an inducement to commit" the crime of child abuse, and is "not just the product
of a crime of child abuse.").
16 H.R. 5337, 111th Cong. (2010).
16 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States in Support
of Petitioner at 9, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08-769).
16 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530-31 (rejecting a drying-up-the-market rationale for
punishing expression that resulted from illegal conduct, and stressing that "there is
no empirical evidence to support the assumption that the prohibition against" the
expression would reduce the illegal conduct).
167 But see Editorial, Disgusting but Not Illegal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2010, at A16.
(reading Stevens as precluding any First Amendment exclusion for crush videos, and
as rejecting both the child pornography analogy and the applicability of the obscenity
exception to such videos).
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In contrast, as discussed above, the evidence that was adduced in
the Stevens litigation indicates that the parallel contention could
probably not be sustained as to dogfighting videos, because dog-
fights are conducted for reasons other than producing and selling
videos.
If either crush videos or dogfighting videos are not treated as
falling within a longstanding categorical exception to free speech,
then a law that criminalized either one could be upheld only if it
satisfied strict scrutiny. Justice Alito's dissenting opinion in Stevens
concludes that a statute that criminalized only crush videos and
depictions of "brutal animal fights" would survive strict scrutiny
because "the crimes depicted in these videos cannot be effectively
controlled without targeting the videos."' For the reasons discussed
above, the government could potentially demonstrate that the dry-
ing-up-the-market rationale is the least restrictive alternative for
deterring the crimes that crush videos depict, but it could probably
not do so concerning dogfighting videos. Moreover, as also
explained above, the drying-up-the-market rationale might be
strictly confined to the "special case" of child pornography,' so that
deterring any criminal conduct other than sexual abuse of children
would continue to depend on prosecuting that conduct, not on prose-
cuting any resulting expression.
Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court has championed as a First Amend-
ment "bedrock"' the principle that government may not regulate
expression based on its content, the Court has condoned two major
exceptions to that principle: for certain categories of expression that
are deemed wholly outside the First Amendment and for any con-
tent-based regulation that can survive strict scrutiny. The 1942 case
of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire contains broad language suggesting
that the Court can relegate new categories of expression to unpro-
tected status based on a subjective balancing test, assessing the costs
and benefits of the expression. Before its ruling in Stevens, the Court
had repeatedly cited that language with apparent approval. The
168 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1601 (Alito, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 1586.
170 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
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1982 case of New York v. Ferber suggests that expression may be
outlawed when it depicts illegal conduct, even though fundamental
First Amendment principles call for punishing the conduct, not the
expression. In Ferber, though, the Court concluded that there was a
sufficiently close nexus between child pornography and the child
sexual abuse it portrayed to warrant punishing the expression as a
means of deterring the conduct.
Ferber's drying-up-the-market rationale has been regularly cited
by proponents of various content-based speech regulations, in sup-
port of both kinds of exceptions to the general rule against such
regulations. Accordingly, in the Stevens litigation, proponents of the
challenged ban on certain depictions of illegal treatment of animals
relied on this rationale as supporting either a new categorical First
Amendment exception or a conclusion that the ban satisfied strict
scrutiny. In rejecting these arguments, the Supreme Court took the
opportunity to reformulate the key passage in Chaplinsky and to
recharacterize Ferber in ways that should strictly limit both decisions'
precedential force for further content-based restrictions. Moreover,
using a different approach to the issues than the Supreme Court
did, the Third Circuit analyzed the weaknesses of Ferber's drying-
up-the-market rationale, making a persuasive case that it should be
strictly confined to the specific context of child pornography.
In sum, the Stevens litigation generated analysis and holdings
that should significantly reinforce the general ban on content-based
regulations of expression. This is of course a positive development
for defenders of free speech, and it also has positive ramifications
for defenders of animal welfare. Culpability and law enforcement
resources should not be deflected from those who actually abuse
animals to those who merely distribute images of abuse, especially
when the images can be employed as valuable aids for identifying
and prosecuting the abusers and for mobilizing public support for
such prosecutions.
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